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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAlVIES ORVILLE \VOOD,VARD, , 
GLEN WOODWARD, THELMA 
DALTON and JOYCE DICKASON, 




BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Appellant and respondents are children of one 
Jam es Leon Woodward. After the decease of Jam es 
Leon 'V oodward, respondents filed suit against appel-
lant seeking the Court to impose a constructive trust 
on the proceeds of a bank account held in the names 
of appellant and her father as joint tenants. Respond-
ents further sought distribution of said proceeds on a 
per capita basis. 
I 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the pre-trial hearing the Court ruled that 
appellant had the burden of going forth with the evi-
dence and that appellant had the burden of proving 
all of the elements of a gift of the proceeds of the joint 
bank account by clear and convincing evidence. Appel-
lant objected to this ruling at the pre-trial hearing an<l 
also immediately prior to the trial in this matter. 
The case was tried without a jury before the Honor-
able John F. Wahlquist on January 15, 1969. At said 
trial appellant carried the burden of going forth with 
the evidence and the burden of proof on the issue of 
whether or not there had been a gift to appellant by 
her father of the proceeds of the joint bank account. 
The Court ruled that there was no gift or transfer 
of the in the joint bank account to appellant 
and that the decedent intended to make a testamentary 
disposition of the funds. The issue of whether or not 
there was a constructive trust was never tried before 
the Court. 
The Court entered judgment in favor of respond-
ents after adjustment for expenses of last illness, burial, 
and other disbursements. Appellant filed a motion for 
a new trial which was denied by the Court and the 
subject appeal was filed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant submits that the trial court committed 
serious and prejudical error at the time of trial and 
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that the procedure used by the trial court together 
with the evidence require reversal of the judgmeut 
as a matter of law. 
STATElVIENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and respondents are the surviving chil-
dren of James Leon 'V oodward, who died intestate 
on August 31, 1964, in Ogden, Utah. Prior to his death, 
l\Ir. 'Voodward owned a small farm near Preston, 
Idaho. In 1942 Mr. Woodward was divorced from his 
wife and was a single man at the time of his death. 
During the years immediately preceding his death, it 
was l\Ir. Woodward's custom to spend the wintertime 
and weekends during the summertime in an apart-
ment in Ogden, Utah, and the balance of the year at 
his farm near Preston, Idaho (T-14). During his 
stay in Ogden it was his custom to visit appellant 
two or three times a week ( T-24). In addition to these 
visits and eating meals at appellant's, appellant took 
the decedent to Salt Lake City for cobalt treatments 
in connection with his cancer condition and he later 
stayed at appellant's house until taken to the hos-
pital where he died ( T-24, 25, 63, & 64). In contrast, 
respondents seldom, if ever, visited their father either 
in Preston or in Ogden. Respondent James Orville 
'V oodward was not aware of his father's address in 
Ogden, didn't see him in the hospital prior to his death, 
and didn't attend his viewing nor his funeral (T-139, 
143 & 144). Respondent Glen 'Voodward saw his father 
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only twice in the year of his father's death and his 
father had been only once in his son's house in Salt 
Lake City from 1958 to the time of his death in 19tH 
(T-117 & 120). Respondent Thelma Dalton had di-
rected her father not to come to her house and visit 
her any more, took sides with her mother against her 
father after the divorce, refused to visit him at his 
farm in Preston because she considered the living 
conditions crude, did not visit him in the hospital dur-
ing his last illness and did not attend his viewing or 
his funeral ( T-36, 84, 9'0, 91, 93, 94 & 95). Respondent 
Joyce Dickason lived in California and 1Haryland 
during the last years of her fa th er' s life and had very 
little contact with him, did not see him during his last 
illness, did not attend his viewing nor his funeral ( T-8, 
40, Ill, & 112). 
In the summer of 1963 the decedent came to Ogden 
and had appellant sign a bank card creating a joint 
tenancy savings account in the First Security Bank 
of Preston, Idaho, in the names of appellant and the 
deceased ( T-7 4) . The proceeds represented moneys 
received from a sale of part of the farm land (T-55 
& 56). 
After the decease of Mr. Woodward, appellant 
had the proceeds of the joint savings account in the 
sum of $12,500.00 transferred to the Bank of Ben 
Lomond in Ogden, Utah, and retained the proceeds 
as her own after paying her father's expenses of last 
illness and burial expenses and after giving her mother 
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$1,000.00 and each of the respondents $1,000.00 with 
tlie exception of respondent James Orville Woodward 
( T- 59 & 78) . The house and remaining farm land were 
probated in Idaho and appellant and respondents 
received equal distributive shares ( T-60) . 
Respondeints made no claim in the probate for a 
Ehare of the proceeds of the joint bank account but later 
filed suit in Utah under the theory of a constructive 
trust ( T-59, 60 & R-1). At the pre-trial hearing the 
Court ruled that appellant would have the burden of 
going forth with the evidence and establishing all the 
elements of a gift of the bank account by clear and 
convincing evidence (R-17). Appellant objected to 
this both at the pre-trial hearing and by motion on 
the morning of the trial arguing that the burden was 
upon respondents to establish a constructive trust and 
to carry the burden of going forth with the evidence 
( T-2 & 6). After a trial before the Court sitting without 
a jury, the Court found that there was no gift of the 
bank proceeds to appellant and entered judgment m 
favor of respondents (R-34 & 39). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR IN COMPELLING APPEL-
LANT TO CARRY THE BURDEN OF GO-
ING FORTH 'VITH THE EVIDENCE AND 
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IN TRYING THE CASE ON THE ISSUE OF 
GIFT RATHER THAN ON THE ISSUE 0.F 
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST. 
Respondents' complaint pleads a cause of action 
based on a constructive trust theory as described in 
paragraph 6 of the complaint, i. e., "A constructive 
trust should be declared with respect to the funds held 
by said Bessie Monson from said joint account ... " 
( R-2 ) . At the pre-trial hearing, the court ruled that 
the decedent was a resident of Idaho and that Idaho 
law was controlling (R-15). The trial court relied on 
the case of Idaho First National Bank vs. First Na-
tional Bank of Caldwell, et al., 340 P.2d 1094 (Idaho 
1959) , which involved an action by an administrator 
to recover for the decedent's estate certain funds de-
posited in a joint account of the decedent and defend-
ants. The Idaho Court held that defendants were 
required, once the question of intent of the decedent 
was raised, to assume the burden of proof and to estab-
lish by clear and convincing evidence all the elements 
of an inter vivos gift. 
The Utah trial court in the instant case followed 
Idaho's substantive law and procedural law as well. 
It is appellant's contention that when the trial court 
compelled appellant to carry the burden of going 
forth with the evidence it committed prejudicial error 
in failing to follow Utah procedural law or the larv 
of the forum. 
The Restatement Of The Law of Conflicts Of 
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Laws, §592, provides that the law of the forum gov-
erns all matters of pleading and the conduct of pro-
tecdings in court. And further, §595 provides that the 
law of the forum governs the proof in court of a fact 
alleged as well as the presumptions and inferences to 
be drawn from the evidence. And more particularly in 
Comment a. the following is found: 
"Proof in court covers all matters falling 
within the description 'burden of proof'. This 
includes what is sufficient evidence on an issue 
of fact to entitle the jury to consider it. It in-
cludes the burden of going forward with the 
evidence; also the question of which party bears 
the risk of non-persuasion of the trier of the 
fact." 
In agreement to the foregoing is 16 Am Jur 2d 
S7(), p. 120, which provides as follows: 
"In matters of procedure, or, as sometimes 
stated, in matters of remedial rights, it is clearly 
settled that every case must be governed by the 
law of the place where the remedy is sought. 
This rule applies in general to all matters of 
pleading, including the sufficiency of pleadings, 
or whether a cause of action is stated in a plead-
ing, and the rules of pleading, to rules of evi-
dence and rules of practice; to matters pertain-
ing to modes of procedure and form of remedy, 
including what form of action is proper and 
whether the action must be at law or in equity; ,, 
In 168 ALR 191, the following is found: 
"As stated in the original annotation, ques-
tions of evidence, as for instance its admissi-
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bility, sufficiency, etc., are regarded as purely 
questions of remedy to be governed by the law 
of the forum, and the question of the presump-
tion and burden of proot is, at least by the weight 
of authority, ordinarily regarded as subject to 
the same rule; and, as a general i:ule, as between 
conflicting rules as to presumption and burden 
of proof prevailing at the situs of the transac-
action and in the forum, that of the latter juris-
diction has been accorded precedence, the rule 
of the former being rejected as merely relating 
to the remedy and being of no extraterritorial 
force." 
The Utah Court followed the general rule in the 
case of Buhler v. lJ-'laddison, 166 P.2d 205 (1946), which 
involved a workmen's compensation claim wherein the 
injury occurred in Nevada and the trial was had in 
Utah. At page 209 of the opinion, the Utah court 
indicated as follows : 
"This action is prosecuted in the of 
Utah upon a cause of action arising in Nevada. 
The merits of the controversy, the elements of 
the cause of action, the substantive rights are 
determined by the law of Nevada; the trial of 
the action, the procedural matters including the 
making of proof and rules of evidence are con-
trolled by the law of Utah." 
It is appellant's further contention that the sub-
stantive law of Utah should have been controlling in 
this case upon the grounds that the joint tenancy bank 
account was a three party contract between the de-
cedent, appellant and the First Security Bank of 
Preston, Idaho. It i.s uncontested that appellant signed 
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the bank signature card in Ogden, Utah, approximately 
one year prior to decedent's death ( T-56, 57 & '7 4). 
This was the last act necessary for the validity of the 
three party contract. 
In lo Am .Jur 2d §39, p .58, the following is found: 
"It is a familiar rule that the construction 
and validity of a contract are governed by 
law of the place where it is made." 
In this connection see the Utah case of Kansas City 
J!rholcsale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corporation, 
73 P.2d 1272 (1937), wherein the following is found 
at page 1274: 
"A contract between parties in different states 
is made at the place where the last act necessary 
to give it validity is performed." 
It seems clear that Utah's substantive law should 
have been followed by the trial court as well as Utah 
procedural law upon the grounds that the agreement 
was finalized in Utah. 
If the trial court had followed Utah's substantive 
or procedural law_. or both, the result would have been 
in favor of appellant. Utah has no counterpart of Idaho 
law as set forth in the case of Idaho First National 
Bank v. First National Bank of Caldwell, et al., as 
previously cited. The Idaho precedent, as set forth 
in this case, is both dangerous and a catalyst for liti-
gation. The following is found in the dissenting opinion 
at page 1100: 
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" ... the effect of the decision of the majority 
is to create further uncertainity as to the effect 
of joint and survivorship bank accounts on the 
death of an owner-depositer." 
And further at page 1101: 
"It appears to us that the ruling of the ma-
jority in this case will nullify the Gray case, 
and is tantamount to holding that the creation of 
a joint account, with the right of survivorship, 
in the matter selected by the decedent is without 
force or effect. The majority rule would permit 
such an act to be challenged in virtually every 
instance; the anomaly is born that the survivor 
must prove the decedent did precisely what he 
unequivocally stated in writing that he did. The 
bank card, or joint account agreement, states that 
the funds deposited with the bank 'shall be owned 
by (the parties to the joint account) jointly, with 
the right of survivorship, and be subject to the 
order or receipt of either of them or the survivor 
of them ... '. The language is clear, without 
ambiguity, unequivocal. These words can be, and 
we believe are, clearly understood or understand-
able by the public. If we are to give any effect 
to these accounts, why should this clearly ex-
pressed intention be ignored?" 
If the Idaho precedent is followed, which places 
the burden on a joint depositer to prove a valid gift, 
the integrity of a joint tenancy bank account is nulli-
fied. Attorneys would immediately counsel their clients 
to test any joint tenancy agreement in court, whether 
involving personal or real property, upon the basis that 
the joint owner may not be able to prove all the elements 
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of a valid gift. The impact on the public and the courts 
is obvious. 
The procedure of requiring claimants to prove a 
constructive trust regarding the proceeds of a joint 
bank account or of jointly held real property serves 
as a safeguard to the integrity of jointly owned prop-
erty agreements since it requires the claimant to prove 
fraud or some form of unconscionable conduct. The 
burden is upon the claimant to go forth with such 
evidence. In the event there is no evidence of fraud or 
wrong doing, there is no basis for litigation and the 
property goes to the joint owner pursuant to the pro-
Yisions of the joint agreement. 
In 54 Am J ur §218, p. 167, it is stated that an 
implied trust by operation of law arises when one 
holds property by fraud, duress, or by commission of 
a wrong or any form of unconscionable conduct. In 
at page 172 it provides that the disappointment 
of a mere expectation does not give rise to a constructive 
trust. 
The following case is typical of the general law 
which holds that fraud, actual or constructive, is an 
essential element for a constructive trust. Boardman 
v. Kendrick, 280 P.2d 1053, 59 N.NL 167. 
In 54 Am J ur §242, page 184, the fallowing is 
found: 
"The general rule is that a constructive trust 
arises where an heir, devisee, or legatee violates 
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a promise to the testator, expressly made or in-
ferable from words or conduct, to hold an in-
heritance, devise or legacy for another or to 
give it to another, upon which the testator relied 
in the making or changing his will in order to 
favor such other person; but it is generally held 
in such cases that the proof 11iust establish the 
facts and circumstances giving rise to the con-
structive trust •with an extraordinar.IJ degree of 
certainty and clarity." (emphasis added) 
This protection was neutralized by the Utah trial 
court when it required appellant to carry the burden 
of going forth with the evidence. 
The earlier Idaho cases recogniz.ed a constructive 
trust based upon fraud as evidenced by the case of 
Brasch v. Brasch, 47 P.2d 676 ( 1935). The Utah Su-
preme Court has followed the traditional concept of 
constructive trust dm,·n through the years. One of the 
earlier cases is the case of Chadwick v. Arnold, 95 P. 
527 ( 1908) . In this case the court made the following 
comment at page 530: 
" ... A second well-settled and even common 
form of trusts ex maleficio occurs whenever a 
person acquires the legal title to land or other 
property by means of an intentionally false and 
fraudulent verbal promise to hold the same for 
a certain specified purpose-as, for example, a 
promise to convey the land to a designated incli-
vidual, or to reconvey it to the grantor, and 
the like-and having thus fraudulently obtained 
the title, he retains, uses, and claims the prop-
erty as absolutely his own, so that the whole 
by rri.eans of which the ownership 
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is obtained is in fact the scheme of actual deceit. 
Equity regards such a person as holding the 
property charged with a constructive trust and 
will compel him to fulfill the trust by 
according to his engagement." 
The Chadwick case was reaffirmed in the case of 
Hawkins v. Perry, 253 P.2d 372 (1953). 
The present status of the Utah law is reflected in 
the case of Jewell v. Horner, 366 P.2d 594, 12 Utah 
2<l 328 ( 1961), which held that the evidence failed to 
support a finding of a parol trust in favor of sons with 
respect to real property which had been conveyed by 
the decedent to his daughter. At page 597 of the opinion 
Justice Callister made the following observation: 
" ... To justify a court in determining from 
oral testimony that a deed which purports to 
convey land absolutely in fee simple was in-
tended to be something different, such as a trust, 
such testimony must be clear and convincing. 
The proof must be something more than that 
modicum of evidence which this court sometimes 
holds to be sufficient to warrant a finding where 
the matter is not so serious as to the overthrow 
of a clearly expressed deed, solemnly executed 
and delivered." 
It would seem that this reasoning holds for the 
instant case since the integrity of joint bank accounts 
an<l other joint property agreements are just as sub-
stantial as a deed of conveyance. 
The Utah trial court committed prejudicial error 
in its procedural rulings in this matter and should be 
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reversed upon the grounds that the Utah courts on both 
substantive and procedural grounds have required 
claimants seeking to impose trusts on jointly held prop-
erty to carry the burden of going forth with the evidence 
and showing by a preponderance of the evidence some 
fraud or unconscionable conduct. Such conduct \Vas 
totally lacking in the case at bar. 
POINT II 
THE OF THE COURT 'VAS 
CLEARLY AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE 
EVIDENCE. 
It is undisputed that a bank account in the nature 
of a joint tenancy was created in the names of the 
decedent and appellant (R-1). Exhibit 1-C is the bank 
signature card and is found at page 21 of the record. 
The following language is pertinent to the issue at 
bar: 
"The joint depositors whose names are signed 
on the reverse side of this card hereby agree with 
each other and with the above bank that all sums 
now on deposit heretofore or hereafter deposited 
by any one or more of said joint depositors with 
said bank to their credit as joint depositors, with 
all accumulations thereon, are and shall he 
owned by them jointly with the right of survivor-
ship, and be subject to the check if the account 
is a checking account or receipt if the account 
is a savings account of any one or more of them 
or of the survivors or survivor of them, and pay-
14 
ment to or on the check or receipt of any one 
or more of them or the survivor shall be valid 
and discharge said bank from liability." (em-
phasis added) 
At the time the decedent had appellant sign the 
joint bank card the only condition placed on the with-
drawal of the money was that appellant take care of 
burial expenses ( T-56 and 57) . It would seem that 
the provisions of the joint bank card should be con-
trolling vesting the title in the bank proceeds in the 
sunivor subject only to appellant's agreement to take 
care of the decedent's burial expenses. At no time did 
the decedent indicate to appellant that the balance of 
the proceeds were to be divided among the other chil-
dren. The integrity of the written instrument creating 
the joint tenancy and the included ownership rights 
should be held intact. 
The sister-in-law of decedent testified that he told 
her on the day of his death that "You don't need to 
worry about that. I have money in the bank for Bessie, 
in her name" (T-11 & 12). 
The brother of the decedent, who was very close 
to him during his stays in Ogden, testified that the 
decedent had told him "If I have anything when I am 
gone, I want Bessie and her family to have it" (T-18). 
Dorothy Miller, a close friend during the decedent's 
stays in Ogden, testified that the decedent said re-
garding respondent James Orville Woodward, "I'll 
never give him another 'D' dime" (T-37). Mrs. Miller 
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further testified that on the Sunday afternoon of the 
decedent's death she stayed with him at the hospital 
and sat and talked with him. She testified that the 
decedent at that time that the bank account "is 
in Bessie's name and my name, Bessie is to pay my bills, 
funeral bill and hospital, whatever I owe and over that, 
what is left is hers" ( T-38) . This witness again re-
affirmed this on page 39 of the transcript as follows: 
"Q. You heard him say that Bessie was to pay 
the bills and the rest was hers ? 
"A. Oh, yes; she was to 'pay all the bills and 
pay my funeral and everything I owe, she is to 
pay that off and the rest is hers' ". 
The Idaho attorney who handled the probate ad-
vised appellant that the money was hers and not 
respondents' ( T-150). The $4,000.00 paid to respond-
ents Glen "\V oodward, Thelma Dalton, and Joyce Dick-
ason and to their mother was not allowed as an inherit-
ance tax deduction on the basis that it was a gift only 
(T-59). 
The brother of the decedent further testified that 
appellant was the only child that the decedent ever 
spoke about and that the decedent said to him, "If it 
wasn't for Bessie, I wouldn't have any place to go 
except your place" (T-15). He further testified that 
the decedent had cried about the treatment he had 
received from respondent Thelma Dalton and had said, 
"Thelma told me, she says, Daddy, I don't want you 
to come to my place anymore. I don't want you to meet 
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my friends" ( T-17). He also testified that appellant 
and only one of the respondents attended the viewing 
and funeral of their father (T-19). 
l\Ir. and l\lrs. Lawrence Webb, decedent's land-
lords while decedent was in Ogden, testified that appel-
lant and decedent's brother were the only visitors at 
ihe apartment except for one visit by one of the re-
spondents during the years that the decedent rented 
their apartment ( T-23, 24 and 31). They further 
testified that the decedent visited appellant approxi-
mately 2 or 3 times a week and that appellant was the 
one he called on to drive him to Salt Lake City for 
cobalt treatments ( T-24 and 25). They testified that 
decedent had advised them that "Well, he said that 
Bessie is the only one that he could depend upon" ( T-
24 and 32). 
Dorothy Miller testified that the decedent told 
her he wasn't wanted at the homes of his other children 
and that they treated him cold every time he would 
go there ( T-35). She further testified that the decedent 
told her, "I think I will stay away from all of them 
but Bessie" ( T-36) . 
On cross examination of Mrs. Miller, respondents' 
attorney questioned her concerning what the decedent 
had said about taking care of all of his children and 
she replied that the decedent told her "He told me all 
along that he didn't think they deserved anything. He 
said, they didn't treat him like a father" (T-39). In 
response to a question from respondents' attorney con-
17 
cerning whether or not she had seen any of the other 
children visit the deceased at the hospital during his 
last illness, l\!Irs. l\!Iiller answered no and then testified, 
"Because I asked him, I said, 'do the children know 
you are sick,' and be said, 'yes,' I said 'have they been 
over to see you,' and he looked at me just like that, just 
like he was making fun of me asking him that question" 
(T-40). 
:Respondent James Orville 'V oodward testified 
that he didn't attend the viewing or funeral, didn't see 
his father in the hospital during his last illness and did 
not know the address of his father's apartment in Ogden 
(T-139, 143 and 144). He further testified that he 
did not know that his father had sold part of the farm 
and that he had no letters in his possession nor had 
he had any conversations with his father which reflectc<l 
that appellant had ever agreed to divide the proceeds 
of the bank account with the other children (T-143). 
Respondent Glen Woodward testified that he had 
supervised the probate and had chosen the probate 
attorney as well as picked a friend to be the adminis-
trator of his father's estate (T-107). He testified that 
appellant had always claimed that the proceeds of 
the bank account were hers ( T-110). He testified 
that he did not know when his father's birthday was, 
sent no birthday presents and saw his father only twice 
in the year of his death in 1964 (T-116 and 117). He 
testified further that he had lived in Salt Lake City 
since 1958 and that his father had been in his house 
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only once ( T-120). He was never apprised by his 
father that part of the farm had been sold and testified 
that he had no letter nor had he had any conversations 
with his father indicating that appellant had promised 
to divide the bank proceeds with the other children. 
,(T-120). 
Respondent Joyce Dickason lived outside of the 
state of Utah during the last years of her father's life 
and had very little contact with him ( T-54 and 112) . 
She also failed to attend the viewing or funeral of her 
father ( T-8). She made no appearance at the trial of 
this cause and accordingly did not testify. 
Respondent Thelma Dalton testified that she did 
not visit her father in the hospital during his last illness 
and di<l not attend the viewing or funeral ( T-84, 90 
and 91). She testified that after the divorce she took 
sides with her mother against her father and that her 
father was aware of her feelings in this regard ( T-93, 
04< and 97). She testified that she chose not to go to 
his farm in Idaho because the living was "so crude out 
there and his water and everything, that was no place 
for a lady to spend" ( T-95) . She testified that it was 
her custom not to give him Christmas presents, birth-
day presents and not to send him mail ( T-98). She 
further testified that her father had never told her part 
of the farm was sold, and that she had no letters from 
him nor had she any conversations with him indicating 
that appellant had agreed to divide the proceeds of the 
bank account (T-99 and 100). 
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Appellant strongly urges that the foregoing testi-
mony of independent witnesses and of respondents 
justifies a reversal of the judgment based upon the rule 
set forth in Haws v. Jensen, 209 P.2d 229 (Utah 1949) 
at page 233 of the opinion wherein the Court said: 
" 'The findings of the trial courts on conflict-
ing evidence will not be set aside unless it mani-
festly a pp ears that the court has misapplied 
proven facts or made findiugs clearly against the 
weight of the evidence.' " 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error when it chose to follow Idaho law 
both on substantive and procedural matters, and by 
doing so, casting aside the whole theory of respondents' 
cause of action of a constructive trust. The precedent 
of requiring a defendant to carry the burden of going 
forth with the evidence and assuming the burden of 
proof in a case of this type is dangerous indeed because 
of its tendency to create litigation and its attack on 
the integrity of written instruments creating joint 
ownerships in property. 
It is appellant's further assertion that the testi-
mony at the trial established clear and convincingly 
that the decedent intended that appellant should have 
the proceeds of the joint bank account due to the close 
relationship he had with appellain't during the last 
years of his life and the neglect of respondents. 
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It is respectfully submitted that the posture of this 
case compels a reversal based on the law and the facts. 
Respect£ ully submitted, 
FROERER, HOROWITZ, PARKER, 
RICHARDS, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW 
RICHARD H. THORNLEY, Esq. 
200 Kisel Building 
Ogden, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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